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ABSTRACT

In this Article, the authors retrace the history and development of

France's securities markets. The authorsfind that the French markets
have become dynamic and diverse in the wake of their modernization. In
contrast to the passivity of the United States regulatory regime, the authors demonstrate that the role of French regulators is more aggressive
and intrusive. The authors also note that, through directives seeking to
coordinate the policies of member states, the European Economic Community serves as the world's leading securities regulator. The authors conclude that French securities laws have been successful in improving disclosure and market efficiency. But they recommend that France establish
clearer lines of authority and control between its regulatory agencies and
make them more accountable to free markets. Finally, the authors recom-
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mend greater cross-culturalunderstandingbetween states as a means of
achieving the common worldwide interest in greater abundance and
prosperity throughfree markets.
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INTRODUCTION

To the ordinary French person La Bourse once was a place of mystery, or even danger.' From Emile Zola's time2 until two decades ago,
such attitudes apparently were empirically verifiable. In France, securities dealing and brokerage operated as highly monopolized guilds, with
trade knowledge passed from father to son for more than 180 years.3 In
1988, when French law renamed the agents de change (stock brokerage
firms) the soci~t~s de bourse, there were only 61 such entities in France,
of which 45 were located in Paris.' The exclusive ParisBourse closed its
doors to women and did not permit vistors until 1972.
How things have changed! Compelled by the pressure of the 1992 integration of the European market 5 and by the fierce foreign competition
1. See generally EMILE ZOLA, L'ARGENT [MONEY] (E.A. Vizetelly trans., 1894)
(1891).
2. Emile Zola's open letter "J'accuse" protested the 12-year army cover-up of the
young Jewish officer Alfred Drefus's mistaken conviction of treason for selling military
secrets to the Germans in December 1894. It was published in the famous French democrat statesman Georges Clemenceau's newspaper L'Aurore, January 13, 1898, in his
eight-year battle to win Drefus's innocence (1897-1905).
3. See INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND CAPITAL REGULATION 1-52 (Harold
Bloomenthal ed., 1991) [hereinafter INT'L SECURITIES & CAPITAL REGULATION]. For
criticism of the prereform French system, see Robert Bordeaux-Groult, Problems of Enforcement and Cooperationin the Multinational Securities Market: A French Perspective, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 453 (1987).
4. LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, July 24, 1990.
5. See the overviews of Anthony Morris et al., Single European Market, 3 Doing
99, at 105,001, AUDREY WINTER ET AL., EUROPE WITHOUT
Bus. Eur. (CCH)
FRONTIERS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE (1989), and the assessment of Karl M. Meessen, Europe en Route to 1992: The Completion of the InternalMarket and Its Impact on NonEuropeans,23 INT'L LAWYER 359 (1989). See generally PAOLO CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE,

1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET (1986);

CHRISTOPHER

TUGENDHAT, MAKING SENSE OF EUROPE (1988). The Single European Act, 1987 O.J.
(L 169) 1, adopted in 1986 to radically transfer the EC from a European customs union
to a single market, followed the European Commission's 1985 White Paper. Commission
of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper From the
Commission to the European Council (June 1985), com (85) (310) final. The Single
European Act amended the Treaty of Rome, which in 1958 established the European
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likely to result, the French government has transformed the Paris capital
market in the past four years to such a degree that it is the most modernized and sophisticated in the world. Based on capitalization (4,333 billion FF in 1991), it now ranks fourth in the world, behind only Tokyo,
New York, and London. Of all European countries, France has the largest number of individual shareholders. 6
In 1991, des Bourses de valeurs mobiliers, the French stock market,
achieved the best performance of all the stock exchanges in Europe, with
an overall growth of twenty percent. However, while already representing more than thirty-one percent of France's nominal GNP, the French
capital market, particularly its stock market, still has tremendous potential for growth. An increasing number of recently privatized enterprises
(many of them giants in their industry, e.g., the investment bank
Paribus)appear on the stock exchange each year, and many of these are
undervalued compared to the relatively overvalued stocks on Wall Street.
Part of the strength of the French securities market lies in its diversity,
unmatched by any other European market. For all of these reasons, the
ParisBourse has become increasingly attractive to foreign investors, including those from the United States.
A few years ago, a French observer described the goal of the financial
markets reforms as "the creation of a unified capital market providing

Economic Community (EEC) to extend the association that began with the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcoNOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 1. The ECSC was established in 1952 and,
unlike the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), is subject to a

50-year period in duration.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL

COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY] art. 97. Euratom was established by a separate treaty on
March 25, 1957, in Rome. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]. The ECSC later merged its governing council
with those of the EEC and Euratom. TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND

A SINGLE

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Apr. 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776.

Merger of the three communities seems to be overdue. The three communities (EEC,
Euratom, and ECSC) share the same decisionmaking structure of the Commission of the
European Communities, Council of the European Communities, European Parliament,
and European Court of Justice. The Maastricht Treaty, infra note 126, however, introduces a change by substituting the term European Community for the term EEC, art.
G(A), throughout the Treaty of Rome. It-now becomes the European Community. The
ECSC, title III of the Maastricht Treaty, and Euratom, title IV, are retained as communities so that the three communities are retained with a name variation to accomodate the
proposed changes. Since the three European communities have been managed by common decisionmaking, the singular reference of the European Community (EC) is increasingly used instead of the Common Market.
6.

SELINA O'CONNER, WORLD EQUITY MARKET: 1991 (1991).

7.

LE NOUVEL

ECONOMISTE,

Jan. 31, 1992.
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investment opportunities from the very short-term to the very long-term
for all segments of the economy." 8 This goal largely has been achieved.
The French capital markets now offer a wide variety of products, including debt and equity securities, futures, money market, and capital securitization. The Ministry of Economy and Finance recently authorized the
issuance of negotiable debt instruments with terms of less than two years
to spur the nation's shorter-term money markets by providing companies
with alternative funding channels to their normal bank loans. Despite
the reforms of the French financial securities markets in recent years,
French corporations so far have made little use of the markets as a way
of raising working capital. 9
Beyond these domestic concerns, no discussion of French securities
laws can be complete without reference to the regulatory framework of
the European Community (EC) in the same area. One commentator has
named the EC "the world's primary actor in accomplishing regulatory
harmony in the field of securities regulation." 'u This primary actor,
which also serves as the world's primary securities regulator for the EC,
is presently the most active and influential organization in the nascent
field of international securities and financial services regulation. The
most important contributions of EC lawmaking in the regulatory area
since 1989 consist of the Prospectus Directive, the Insider Trading Directive, the Mutual Funds Directive, and the Second Banking Directive.
Significantly, the Prospectus Directive will allow certain issuers, from
member states to make public offerings throughout the Community's
markets using a common prospectus. The Banking Directive will allow a
bank to provide a variety of banking services, including investment banking services, if authorized by its home state, throughout the Community
on the basis of a single license. 1 Older EC proposals include the Take8. P. JAFFRE, L'unification du marche des capitaux, LA REVENUE BANQUE, Apr.
1986, at 332.
9.
Decree 92-137 (Mar. 1992) reprinted in 2 THomSON'S INT'L BANKING REGULATOR 4 (1992).
10. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 193 (1990).

11. Financial services under the Second Banking Directive, which becomes effective
on January 1, 1993, and the amended proposal for Investment Services Directive fall
outside this Article's focus. See Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989
on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the
Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending [First
Council] Directive 77/780 [the First Council Banking Directive of 12 December 1977,
1977 O.J. (L 322) 30], 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1; Amended Proposal for a Council Directive
on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1990 O.J. (C 42) 7; Amended Proposal
for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institu-
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over Directive 2 and the Investment Services Directive. The Directive on
Investment Services, if adopted, "would provide for a home state license
that would allow investment firms to provide in any member state the
investment services that the home state authorizes. A deadlock over a
proposed amendment to restrict off-exchange and off-market trading activities by investment firms has held up passage of this directive since
1991.13
It is important to note, however, that these directives are not self-executing and require national laws for implementation. Moreover, most of
their provisions only set minimum requirements. The national authorities of member states still maintain broad control and autonomy in the
securities and financial services areas.
II.

THE FRENCH STOCK EXCHANGE SYSTEM

The French stock exchange system is comprised of three markets: 1)
The official stock exchange (march officiel), 2) the second market (second marchb), and 3) the over-the-counter market (marchb hors cWt).
The principal differences among these markets are the size and scope of
the activities of the listed securities issuers and the preconditions that
such issuers must satisfy in order to list their securities. Of the three
French markets, the Official List Exchange is the largest and most
prestigious. 4
A.

The Official List Exchange

The Official List Exchange consists of a cash trading sector and a
forward trading sector. The cash trading sector is called marchb au
comptant, also translated as cash market. The forward trading sector
known as the march q rbglement mensuel, also translated as the
15
monthly settlement market, is where the most active stocks are traded.
On the cash market, investors may place orders for any quantity of
securities, starting with a single unit. "Title to securities traded on [this]

market passes immediately upon the effectuation of such a trade, irretions, 1992 O.J. (C 50) 5; Amended Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the
Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 332) 6; Council
Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 on Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L

124) 16.
12.
DENV.
13.
14.

See SAMUEL WOLFF, Securities Regulation in the European Community, 20
J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 99, 99-101 (1991).
Id. at 101.
Banking-Financing,2 Doing Bus. France, Nov. i990, (M.B.) § 15.04[2][c][iil.

15. Id.
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spective" of the timing of certificate delivery.1" Thus both buyers and
sellers must be prepared to settle their transactions immediately.
On the monthly settlement market, sellers and buyers agree to make
full payments for securities traded or a fixed future date at the price
quoted at the time of such agreement. 7 While transactions once concluded are firm in both price and quantity, actual cash settlement and
delivery of securities do not occur until the end of the trading month. All
such trades must be made in lots of five, ten, twenty-five, fifty, or one
hundred.
Trading on the listed market used to take place on the Paris Bourse
and on six other regional stock exchanges. Since January 24, 1991, however, these exchanges have been merged into a single national market.
Consequently, transactions and most supervision of the exchange are
now centralized in Paris. "With this change, the regional bourses have
lost their monopoly over regional stock trading. But, they are now entitled to trade in all national stocks, provided that [the regional bourses]
meet the capital requirements of Parisian firms."' 8
B.

The Second Market

The second market (Le seconde march) provides a market for the
shares of companies not large enough to be traded on the official market.
Companies listed on the second market frequently switch over to the official market after a three to five year period. 9 Launched in 1983, the
second market is now the largest in Europe. At the end of 1990 the
second market listed 295 firms with a total capitalization of FF 139 billion ($27.2 billion). This was three times the size of the Unlisted Securities Market in London.2" At present there are approximately eighty
companies listed on the second market. After a probationary period, and
subject to the approval of the Commission des opgrations de Bourse
(COB), 2 the Consul des Bausses des Valeus (CBV)2 2 must decide
whether to maintain the shares on this market, strike them off, or admit
them to the official list. Until recently, the CBV effectively decided at

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Regional Exchange Merge with Paris to Create Simple National Equities Market, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1. The capital requirements were FF 25
million ($5 million) at the beginning of 1991.
19. Banking-Financing,supra note 14, § 1504[2][c][ii][B].
20. SBF Plans Second Market Reform, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Feb. 25, 1991, at 8.
21. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
22. Id.
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least four years after the introduction of the company on the second market, based on the financial accounts for the third year of activity of the
relevant company. The CBV now decides at the end of the third year."
Trading on the second market is on a cash basis only.
C.

The Over-the-Counter Market

The over-the-counter market (marchk hors-cbt ) does not create a permanent market for any security; rather, it functions merely as irregular
market for the occasional sale of French or foreign securities. Under this
market regime, the seller and purchaser of securities simultaneously exchange the securities for full payment. Any company or shareholder may
list securities on the over-the-counter market by filing an application
with the Stock Brokers Association (SBF)24 and by publishing certain
minimum financial information concerning the issuer. When a security is
not traded for a period of one month, it is withdrawn from the market.
Stockbrokers have no monopoly over this market because securities can
be traded without formalities or conditions.25

III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND MAJOR REGULATORS
A.

Statutory Framework

Although the French government first comprehensively addressed securities regulation in an ordinance issued in 1967, it is only in recent
years that the government has created a truly effective regulatory scheme
for securities. The 1967 ordinance introduced France to the concept of
securities regulation as a separate area of law and established a specialized government agency, the COB, to regulate activities falling within
the purview of the ordinance. As originally adopted, the ordinance contained only the most rudimentary rules and endowed the COB with very
limited authority.26 It was left to a law enacted by the Parliament in
1987 and signed by the President in early 1988, however, to lay the true
foundation of the postreform French securities regulation." While making investor protection the chief task of the COB, the 1988 law created a
new agency, the CBV, to maintain discipline on the stock exchanges.
23. Banking-Financing,supra note 14, § 1504[2][c][ii][B].
24. See discussion infra part II.B.3.
25. CBV Rfglement (Apr. 21, 1988).

26. Ordonnance No. 67-833 (Sept. 28, 1967). See also Georgeatte Miller, in
supra note 3, ch. 7.

SECURITIES & CAPITAL REGULATION,

27.

Loi No. 88-70 (Jan. 22, 1988).

INT'L

1993]

SECURITIES REGULATION

The CBV is responsible for making rules on the creation and duties of
stockbrokers, the operation of the stock exchanges, and the listing re-

quirements of the exchanges. This statute also gave the SBF, on the
other hand, executive authority to examine the listing applications subnitted to the CBV, decide on the suspension of listings, and register the
price of listed securities. Nineteen eighty-eight additionaly witnessed the
enactment of a law setting forth the fundamental rules concerning the
operation of open-end mutual funds in France.2 s In August 1989 the
French legislature adopted a law reorganizing and increasing the power
of the COB. This law further strengthened the independence of the
COB by providing it with the authority to determine its own budget
within legally authorized limits."9 This statute also laid down the first
comprehensive body of rules concerning takeovers through tender offers
in France. Scattered in among these major legislative actions are many
decrees issued by the Prime Minister, arrbtes issued by the Minister of
the Economy and Finance, and r~glements issued by the COB. While
the decrees aim to fill in the gaps left by the major statutes, the arrtes
are issued to approve the COB and CBV regulations. The corpus of
General Regulations (Rfglements G~ngrale) issued by the CBV, which
has been modified since 1988, fills out this list of secuities-related
regulations.
B.

Major Regulators

1. The Stock Exchange Commission (Commission des Oprations de
Bourse or COB)

The principal French agency regulating securities transactions is the
COB, which has the responsibility of regulating, developing and expanding the French securities market.30 The 1989 statute strengthens the
independence of the COB by providing this body with the authority to

determine its own budget within legally authorized limits.

1

The COB has three primary functions. First, it regulates and supervises the various French exchanges and French brokers by promulgating
rules and regulations concerning the functioning of the exchanges and
related activities, including the offering, buying, and selling of shares. 2

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Loi No. 88-1202 (modified by Arrete (Feb. 7, 1992)).
Loi No. 89-531.
See Ordonnance No. 67-883, supra note 26, art. 1.
Loi No. 89-531.
Id. art. 4.
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Second, it reviews and verifies information disclosed to the public by reporting companies. Finally, the COB polices the exchanges and ensures
that companies listed on the exchanges disclose the requisite information.
Purusant to this responsibility, COB may, for instance, require a company to inform publicly its shareholders and the market of any previous
disclosure violations, and if the company refuses, the COB may officially
inform the public of the violation. 3
The active role of the COB in verifying information contrasts with the
passive role played by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
United States. Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation S-K
provides that the forepart of the registration statement and outside front
cover of the prospectus state in large boldface type: "These Securities
have not been approved or disapproved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission nor has the Commission passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of this prospectus. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal
34
offense."

'

In addition to its verification function, the COB has investigative and
enforcement authority. It may, after obtaining a court order, require that
all a company's assets be placed into an escrow account, and the COB
may obtain the equivalent of a preliminary injunction (interdiction
temporair d'activite professionelle), temporarily preventing a company
from engaging in business or selling securities. The COB has investigatory power to conduct searches and to seize documents as well as broad
authority to conduct discovery. It has authority to levy fines of up to the
greater of ten million French Francs or ten times the profit realized from
the illegal activities. Anyone not cooperating with a COB investigation
may face criminal liability or disciplinary action.35 After 1988, the CBV
assumed the COB's role as watchdog over company listing and reporting. The COB, however, retains the exclusive right to conduct
investigations.
In 1990 the COB issued a series of regulations covering subjects such
as failure to disclose information to the public (dfaut d'information du
public), the tort of insider trading (dMlits d'initi~s), manipulation of
prices (l'htablissements des cours), abuse of office (l'utilization abusive
des pouvoirs ou des mandats), portfolio management (gestion de
portefeuille), and underwriting procedures (procbdure de rescrit).3"

33. Id. art. 3.
34. Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation S-K, item 501, 17 C.F.R. part
229.501 (1992).
35. Ordinance No. 67-883, supra note 26, arts. 37, 2, 5, 6, 10.
36. See LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, SPECIAL PLACEMENTS, Mar. 1991.
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The COB has also been active in the area of international cooperation.
It has signed a mutual assistance agreement with the SEC and the Chicago Commodity Trading Commission and with the British Securities
and Investment Board (SIB)." The mutual assistance agreement between the COB and the United States SEC, which came into effect on
January 31, 1991, obliges the two agencies to investigate securities law
violations on each other's behalf and to alert each other as to suspected
irregularities. The COB has also signed information exchange accords
with its counterparts in Japan and Switzerland to ensure parallel regulations and reciprocity between France and other states. 8
2. The Stock Exchange Council (Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs or
CBV)
The CBV possesses general legislative and judicial decisionmaking authority over the stock exchanges. This body develops the rules and regulations necessary for the orderly function of the exchange and ensures the
compliance with these rules. It must also approve the listing or removal
of a company's securities from a stock exchange. 9 Finally, it has the
responsibility of analyzing and approving the price offered in any tender
offer within five days of bidders' applications.40
The CBV consists of twelve members. Ten are elected by stock brokers, one is appointed by the employees of stock brokers (Socits de
Bourse) and the Stock Brokers Association (Socit des Bourses Franraises, or SBF), and one is appointed by the Minister of the Economy
and Finance.4 1
3. The French Stockbrokers Association (La Socit des Bourses
Franqaises or SBF)
Formerly called La Compagnie Nationale des Agents de Change, the
SBF is a self-regulating organization whose membership includes all securities brokers in France. This body has the executive authority to examine the listing applications submitted to the CBV, to decide on the
suspension of listings, and to register the price of listed securities.42
37.
38.

Id.
COB Negotiating Information Pacts with Japanese, Swiss Regulators,

SEC. REG. REP.,

INT'L

June 17, 1991, at 7.

39. Decree No. 88-254 (Mar. 17, 1988).
40. R~glement G~n~ral du Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs, approved by Arrete, Apr.
21, 1988, arts. 182-86.

41.

Loi No. 88-70.

42.

David J. Berger, Guidelinesfor Mergers and Acquisitions in France, 11 Nw. J.
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LISTING ON THE EXCHANGE

A. Listing Qualifications
1. Domestic Corporations
To be listed on the official exchange, a company must have a market
capitalization of at least one million European currency units (ecu) and
have published its annual financial statements for the three previous
years.4 3 For those companies trading on the Official List market at least
25 percent of their equity and 80,000 of their shares must be available
for sale to the public, although this requirement may be waived in cases
in which a company has put on the market on the day of listing sufficient capitalization and number of shares to assure an orderly market
(no less than 600,000 shares with a share capital equal to no less than
30 million FF). The company must have published or have filed its annual financial statements for the three fiscal years preceding the request
for listing and must have the financial statements for the last two fiscal
years certified by the company's Statutory Auditors."'
Lastly, an establissement crdit "I or other qualified intermediary designated by the company to oversee the listing process must file the application for listing on behalf of the company with the Stock Exchange

Council.4

INT'L L. & Bus. 484, 510 (1991).
43. See R~glement G~nral du Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs, approved by Arrete,
Apr. 21, 1988, tit. III.
44. See COB R~glement No. 88-04 (setting forth disclosure requirements for public
issuers; shares held by the company's employees are counted for the purposes of this
twenty-five percent requirement). The CBV may also take into account shares that may
be issued in exchange for certain convertible securities previously subscribed to by the
public. See CBV General Decision No. 88-2 Relating to the Listing on the Official Exchange, art. 6.
45.
regular
sion in
nancial

Establissement crbdit are legal entities that carry out banking operations on a
basis and are subject to the rules and regulations governing the banking profesFrance, including banks, finance companies (socigtgsfinancihres), specialized fiinstitutions (institutionsfinanci~res speciali~es), mutual or cooperative banks

(banques mutualiste ou coopertitive), savings associations (caisses d'epargne et de
prhvoyance), and municipal credit banks (caisses de credit municipal).
46. Raglement Gfnfral, art. 3.1.1. See General Decision No. 88-2, arts. 4-5, for a
detailed list of the documents and information to be submitted at the time of the filing of
the application for listing.
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2.

Foreign Corporations

To list its securities on the official stock exchange, a foreign corporation must obtain the prior authorization of the Ministry of Economy and
Finance unless it is a resident of the EEC or of a member state of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).47
Once a company has received the necessary authorization, a credit establishment or other qualified intermediary acting on behalf of the foreign
company must file the application for listing. Unless the CBV makes an
exception, the foreign company must have published or filed its financial
statements for the last three fiscal years, the last two of which must be
certified by its Statutory Auditors. The company must translate into
French all financial statements and notes annexed thereto. It must also
submit a prospectus (note d'information) setting forth certain information relating to the foreign company's organization, financial situation,
and activities to the COB for approval prior to the listing.4 The CBV
makes its decision on the listing and notifies the credit establishment that
submitted the application for the foreign company within six months of
the receipt of such an application, or, if the CBV requires supplementary information, within six months of the receipt of this additional
information.49
3.

Second Market Listing

A listing on the second market is valid for three years. At the end of
this period the issuer may, with recommendation by the SBF and approval of the CBV, list its securities on the Official Exchange if the company has developed accounting procedures that satisfy the rules and regulations governing the official stock exchange. The issuer must publish
the same accounting information as companies listed on the official stock
exchange, notably the consolidated financial statements and semi-annual
reports, including a table of activities and profits or losses.5"
B.

Disclosure Requirement

Before engaging in an initial public offering of securities (appel public
b, l'pargne), a company must prepare a prospectus (note d'information)
disclosing specific information required by the COB. It must issue a prospectus in any transaction that would constitute an offer of, or for, secur47.
48.
49.
50.

D~cret No. 89-938, Dec. 29, 1989, art. 10.
COB R6glement 88-04, arts. 2-5, 14-16.
R~glement G~n~ral, art. 3.1.7.
CBV R~glement G~nraI, Apr. 21, 1988, art. 3.
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ities, including a tender offer . 5 The COB mandates disclosure regarding
the following issues: all relevant facts concerning the securities and the
issuer; a description of the issuer's principal activities, including its business(es), employees, and subsidiaries; recent financial information including balance sheets and profit and loss statements; the names of the
officers, directors, senior management, and controlling shareholders, and
any relationship thereto; the reasons for the issuance and planned use of
proceeds; and the financial institutions advising the issuer and guaranteeing placement of the securities. 2
When a formal prospectus is too technical for a nonprofessional to
understand readily, "the COB in certain instances requires that issuers
prepare and disseminate to the public a prospectus summary (abrg# de
la note d'information). This summary may not exceed six pages, must
refer to the formal prospectus and must contain a coupon enabling
the
3

5
reader to order a copy of the formal prospectus, free of charge.")
The COB must approve a prospectus before the prospectus can be

issued to the public. The COB may require an issuer to change the prospectus, or may conduct an investigation to determine the accuracy of the
disclosures by sending its agents to the issuer's offices or by requesting
representatives of the issuer to appear before it. Frustrating the COB's
factfinding activities or refusing to produce documents or appear before
54
the COB subjects the issuer to penal sanctions.
Once the COB has approved a prospectus, the issuer must make the
prospectus available to the public at its registered office, at all establishments where subscriptions for the securities, and, if the securities are
55
listed on a stock exchange, at the Stock Brokers Association.
C.

The Second Market

The requirements that a company must satisfy to list its securities on
the second market are simpler and significantly less burdensome than
those necessary for listing on the official stock exchange. The application
process is more streamlined, and the required minimum percentage of
the company's shares offered to the public is only ten percent.5 6 Listing

51. Ordonnance 67-833, art. 6.
52. Annex I to the Instruction of February 2, 1982 of the Commission des Operations de Bourse Relating to Prospectus Distributed by Companies Making Public
Offerings.
53. See Banking-Financing,supra note 14, § 15.04[3][b][i].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 15.04[2][c][ii][B].
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on the second market also requires less information to be disclosed to the
public. A prospectus for listing on the second market, known as a note
de presentation, must set forth information concerning the company's
organization, financial situation, and activities recommended by the
COB. This prospectus must be filed with the COB no later than three
months prior to the date on which the securities are to be listed. Unlike
the prospectus filed with respect to a listing on the official stock exchange, the prospectus filed in connection with a listing on the second
market need not be formally approved by the COB. The company files
the final text of the prospectus with the COB, which then makes the text
57
available to the public.

D.

The Listing Directives and the Prospectus Directive of the
European Economic Community

Prior to the adoption of the Prospectus Directive in April 1989, two
EEC directives governed the offering and listing of securities in the common market. The EEC Listing Conditions Directive of 197958 and the
Stock Exchange Admission Directive sets forth the minimum conditions
for securities to be listed on a stock exchange located in the EEC and
requires member states to ensure that securities may not be admitted to
listing in their state unless they satisfy these conditions. These listing
conditions involve matters such as the size of the issuer, its period of

existence, and the distribution of its shares in the market. The Directive
also imposes numerous reporting obligations on issuers of listed securities. Non-EEC issuers listing in an EEC state must meet the minimum
conditions and obligations of the Directive as enacted into national law
in- the appropriate state.5 The EEC Listing Particulars Directive of
1980 ' 0 and the Stock Exchange Prospectus Directive aim to coordinate
the differences in member state disclosure requirements for stock exchange listings. This directive requires a member state to ensure that the
listing of securities upon a stock exchange in its territory is contingent
upon the publication of a disclosure document referred to as a "listing
particular." While requiring the listing particular to contain all information necessary for an investor to make an "informed assessment" of the

57. Id.
58. Council Directive 79/279 of 5 March 1979 Coordinating the Conditions for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21.
59. Id. pmbl. 1 6.
60. Council Directive 80/390 of 17 March 1980 Coordinating the Requirements for
the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to Be Published
for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1.
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financial position and prospects of the issuer, the Directive allows a
member state to create numerous exemptions, such as exemptions for
securities that have been publicly issued or issued in connection with a
takeover bid in which, within the preceding year, the issuer published an
equivalent disclosure document in that state. States may not publish listing particulars until they have approved them. Once approved, the state
must publish them. A state can make the publication either by inserting
the listing particular in one or more newspapers circulated throughout
the member state or by a brochure made available to the public.61
Furthermore, the Prospectus Directive seeks to coordinate the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny, and distribution of a prospectus to
be used when securities are "offered to the public for the first time"
within a member state. Thus, the Directive does not apply to securities
that are already listed in member states.6 2 If a company makes a public
offer of transferable securities in a member state, and at the same time
the securities are the subject of a listing application in the same state, the
Listing Particulars Directive governs the prospectus requirements.63 Article 11 of the Prospectus Directive sets forth the minimum prospectus
disclosure requirements for publicly offered securities that are not the
subject to the listing application.64 Member states, however, have the
freedom to provide the manner of publication of such a prospectus 5 and
may require the offeror to prepare the prospectus in accordance with the
Listing Particulars Directive, even though the securities in question are
not the subject of a listing application.6" In this manner, the Prospectus
Directive paves the way for uniform regulations of disclosure for both
7
listing and nonlisting public offerings.
Another feature of the Prospectus Directive is a provision that when
public offerings are made within short intervals of each other in two or
more member states, all member states must recognize and accept a prospectus prepared and approved in accordance with the Prospectus Direc-

61. Id. arts. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 18 and 20.
62. Council Directive 89/298 of 17 April 1989 Coordinating the Requirements for
the Drawing-up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to Be Published When
Transferable Securities are Offered to the Public, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8, art. 1, sec. 1.
63. Id. art. 7.
64. Id. art. 11.
65. Id. art. 15.
66. Id. art. 12(1).
67. The 1989 prospectus directive and a separate mutual recognition directive
adopted in 1990 continue to integrate the listing and public offering process in the Community by allowing a company to use listing particulars and prospectuses almost interchangeably. See WOLFF, supra note 12, at 101.
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tive and the Listing Particulars Directive. 8
In France, the regulations adopted in 1988 govern listing on the stock
exchange, delisting, and disclosure requirement for public offerings.6 9
In 1990 the COB adopted new rules designed to comply with the
EEC Integration Directive of June 22, 1987 governing mutual recognition of listing particulars. Thus, EEC issuers listing in one member state
70
can use the same listing particulars in France.
V.

REGULATION OF STOCKBROKERS AND INTERMEDIARIES

A. Brokerage Firms
Stockbrokers have enjoyed a monopoly on the negotiation of securities
on the stock exchanges. 7 ' The role of intermediaries such as portfolio
managers, banks, and other credit establishments is restricted to transmitting orders received from clients to stockbrokers. Certain direct and
indirect sales (cession directe ou indirecte), however, such as those between two individual persons, and those between two companies, one of
which holds at least twenty percent of the stock of the other company, do
not take place via a stockbroker.
Stockbrokers may also purchase and sell securities on their own account (se porter contrepartie), manage portfolios, and negotiate securities, futures, and options. Stockbrokers are responsible to their clients
(donneurs d'ordres) for the delivery and payment of the securities they
buy and sell on the market. 2
The CBV must approve all stockbrokers, and all stockbrokers must
present sufficient guarantees concerning their composition and amount of
their registered capital, their financial and technical means, as well as
the experience of their directors. 3 An applicant denied approval may
appeal the CBV's decision to the Court of Appeals within one month of

68.
69.

Supra note 62, art. 21(1).
France:Amendments to Stock Exchange General RegulationsApproved, Doing

Bus. Eur. (CCH), supra note 5, TT 120-604.
70. COB Rules Harmonized with EEC, INT'L

SEC. REG. REP.,

Mar. 12, 1990, at 2.

The French Ministry of Economy and Finance has recently approved COB R~glement
92-02, which implements the EEC Prospectus Directive.
71. No new socits de bourse may be authorized prior to December 31, 1991. See
Loi No. 88-70, art. 24(2). In theory, 1992 should have seen a fresh opening of competition in this industry, but that has not happened so far.
72. Loi No. 88-70, art. 3.
73. See id. art. 4; CBV R~glement G~nfral, art. 2.1.1.
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receiving notification of the CBV's decision."4
The reforms in the past five years have enabled domestic and foreign
banks to buy stakes in stockbrokers' capital, while at the same time have
allowed brokers access to the money markets."5 The French stockbrokers
thus have gradually lost their monopoly on stock trading.
In conjunction with the United Kingdom's Securities and Investments
Board (SIB), the COB has adopted a set of common ethical principles
regarding relationships between the financial intermediaries and their
customers. Among these principles: 1) A firm should be able to deploy
the necessary resources for the proper performance of its activities. It
should put in place adequate internal organization and procedures, including appropriate staff dealing rules. It should properly supervise staff
activities. It should have procedures to facilitate compliance with the regulatory system. 2) A firm should make itself aware of the situation and
objectives of its customers and should inform them when necessary about
risks, deals undertaken on their behalf, and any other relevant facts. 3)
In the interests of fairness and diligence, a firm should not abuse its
position to the detriment of its client. It should act with due skill, care,
and diligence on its client's behalf. It should take reasonable steps to
obtain the best execution of customer orders. 4) A firm should be vigilant
to prevent potential conflicts of interest, and when it cannot avoid conflicts, a firm should take all reasonable steps to ensure fair treatment to
all its customers.
B.

Mutual Funds in France

The mutual fund industry requires special and separate consideration.
This industrial is a major component of the French financial sector, the
largest in Europe, and third in, the world, representing some FF 2,000
billion ($339 billion) of investments."6 There are two kinds of mutual
funds, the SICAVs and the Fonds Communs de Placement, both of
which are open-end funds. The industry's trade organization is the
French Mutual Fund Association (L'Association des Socits et Fonds
Franqaisd'Investissement) (ASFFI).
A law enacted in 1988 governs the operation of SICAVs and the
Fonds Communs de Placement." This law, while designed to clarify
74.

Dfcret No. 88-603, art.3.

75. LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, July 13, 1990.
76. INT'L SEC. REG. REP., January 27, 1992.
77. See Loi No. 88-1201, Dec. 23, 1988, and the arretes and decrees issued pursuant
thereto. The law of 1988 brought France into line with EEC rules on mutual funds.

There are now more than 5000 mutual funds registered in France. By the end of May
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mutual fund regulation, is not free of defects. It imposes Chinese walls
between management and depositories of the mutual funds. Nevertheless,
in about nirety-five percent of securities firms, the addresses of these two
supposedly separate entities are the same. Moreover, an agreement between the COB and the Paris Auditors Association delegates routine
control of only a handful of funds to the association. One way to further
the separation of mutual fund management and depositories mandated
by the 1988 law would be for the securities clearing house, SICAVAM,
to break down its accounts by fund, rather than by operator, so that
regulators could more easily discover duplication. The depository is responsible for all the activities of the managers, and if any abuses or false
declarations in this area are not rectified, auditors may refer the case to
the COB or to the courts. "The COB can order a judicial inquiry, and
in the case of an ethical problem, auditors are empowered to call in the
mutual fund disciplinary council."778 The problem of bottleneck of administrative approval also exists given the increasing volume in mutual
funds transactions. In response to complaints from the industry, the
COB has streamlined procedures for approving new mutual funds
(within one month) and for approving changes to existing funds (eight
days).
In May 1991 the COB approved a code of practice for mutual fund
managers drawn up by the ASFFI. "Although not all fund management
firms in France are members of the ASFFI, all firms must nevertheless
abide by this code, since they must pledge to honor the code as a condition of COB new fund authorization. If firms violate the new rules, the
COB (will) report the case to the mutual fund disciplinary council,
which was set up (in 1990) and consisting of securities market regulators
79
and professionals."1
C.

The Mutual Funds Directive of the European Economic
Community

The Mutual Funds Directive coordinates the laws relating to investment undertakings under the umbrella of "Undertakings for Collective
Investment in Transferable Securities" (UCITS).8 0 As defined in article
1990, the COB approved 54 European mutual funds for marketing in France under the
European Community UCITS directive of October 1, 1989.
78. Auditors Group Assails Rule Bending on Fund Separation, INT'L SEC. REG.
REP., Feb. 26, 1990, at 1-2.
79. COB OKs Code of Practicefor Mutual Fund Managers,INT'L SEC. REG. REP.,
May 20, 1991, at 2.
80. Council Directive 85/611 of 20 December 1985 on the Coordination of Laws,
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1.2 of the Directive, such undertakings represent collective investments
in transferable securities of capital raised from the public, whose units
are, at the request of holders, repurchased or redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of those undertakings' assets. These are in effect open-end,
redeemable mutual funds. The investors can recover the net asset value
of an investment by redeeming their units or selling them to the
managers.
The main feature of the Directive is "home country" authorization: A
UCITS established in a member state may be promoted throughout the
EEC if it conforms with the Directive's minimum requirements, subject
to local marketing and advertising rules. Each UCITS must produce a
detailed prospectus containing certain information as set forth in the Directive, such as financial reports and prices of units. When invesotrs
market units in a member state other than the fund's home state, the
"competent Authorities" 8 1 of both states must be informed, and those of
the Home State must provide those of the Host Member State with a
certification indicating that the fund fulfills Directive condition.
In 1988 France enacted legislation designed to harmonize French mutual funds law with the EEC UCITS directive. The government adopted
additional regulations applicable to EEC-based funds in late 1989. By
early 1990, about thirty investment funds from other8 2EEC countries had
obtained authorization to offer securities in France.
VI.

INSIDER TRADING

A. Insider Trading Under French Law
Insider trading represented the most common violation of securities
laws in France in 1990. Nearly one-third of inquiries and nine of fifteen
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, as amended by Council Directive 88/220 of 22 March 1988 Amending, as Regards the Investment Policies of Certain
UCITS, Directive 85/611, 1988 O.J. (L 100) 31 [hereinafter Council Directive]. See
also Council Recommendation 85/612 of 20 December 1985 Concerning the Second
Subpragraph of Article 25(2) of Directive 25/611, 1988 O.J. (L 375) 19. For a feasible
proposal for United States reform of the Investment Company Act of 1940, by transplanting the UCITS model to section 7(d) to attain similar regulatory standards for parallel, reciprocal cross-border investment opportunities, Patrick J. Paul, Note, The European Community's UCITS Directive: One Model for United States Regulatory Change
in a Globalized Securities Market, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 61 (1992).
81. Council Directive, supra note 86.
82. France:Bill Submitted on Mutual Funds, Doing Bus. Eur. (CCH) 98-195, at
97,201.
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cases referred for public prosecution involved insider trading.
In 1990 the COB drew up and the Finance Minister approved new
sets of rules addressed to curb this pattern of abuse.8 3 The new COB
rules clearly delineate four categories of insiders who possess privileged
information: 1) chairperson of the board, managing director, members of
the directorate, directors, and members of the supervisory board of a
company, as well as their spouses; 2) dealers and other personnel involved in the preparation and execution of an order; 3) people receiving
privileged information through their work; and 4) anyone receiving such
information from people in the other three categories. The first category
of persons must prove that the profits they realized on transactions in the
securities of a company with which they are affiliated do not result from
inside information, but the government bears the burden of proving that
such persons had access to and used inside information.84 If the court
finds that a legal entity has engaged in insider trading, it holds the entity
criminally liable.8 "
The rules also require the information provided to the public by listed
companies to be precise and sincere. The information disclosed in France
must be at least as complete as information published abroad."6
Securities of an issuer must disclose to the public, "at the earliest opportunity,""7 the terms of the proposed transaction. The disclosure must
contain all material facts that, if known, would significantly affect the
price of the security in question. Any person planning to engage in, for
his or her own account, any financial transaction likely to significantly
affect the price of the securities of an issuer, must disclose to the public
at the earliest opportunity.
The rules also set forth conditions governing the independence and
responsibilities of fund managers and of companies trading in their own
shares. Parties that repurchase their own shares must report each transaction in advafice to the COB, undertake the transaction against the
market price trend, and limit their transactions to twenty-five percent of
daily trading volumes during the previous five opening days for monthly
settlement trades and thirty days for cash trades.8 8
83. COB Rtglement No. 90-08, art. 2.
84. Banking-Financing,supra note 14, § 15.04[5] (citing COB R~glement 90-08-78
(Matthew Bender 1991)).
85. Id.
86. France: Securities Regulations Approved on Public Disclosure,Pricing,Ruling
Requests, Insider Information, DOING Bus. EUR. (CCH) 98-604, at %97,518.
87. COB R~glement No. 90-08, art. 2.
88. COB Reglement 90-02. These rules are criticized as being too harsh and exceeding the authority of the COB because they expand the scope of the term "insider infor-
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The Insider Trading Directive of the European Economic
Community

In addition to French domestic law, EC law also provides regulations
to discourage insider trading in the French securities market. The Council adopted the Insider Trading Directive89 in 1989. This Directive instructs member states to prohibit anyone who, in the exercise of employment, profession, or duties, acquires inside information from taking
advantage of that information to buy or sell listed securities in his territoryf 0 Member states are obligated to establish and apply penalties sufficient to promote compliance with the measures taken pursuant to the
Directive. Unlike United States law, this EC directive only applies to
securities admitted to trading on a market that is regulated by "public
bodies," that "operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to
the public."'" The Directive specifically permits member states to exclude transactions effected without a professional intermediary outside a
regulated market. 2 France incorporated the Directive when the government approved COB regulation 92-02 in March 1992 prior to the final
date of June 1, 1992 for incorporation into the internal law of EC member states.
VII.
A.

TENDER OFFERS IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS

Statutory and Regulatory Framework

A "hostile takeover" occurs when a firm acquires a publicly held company over the opposition of that company's management. To achieve this
goal, hostile bidders often use "tender offers" in which they "offer to
stockholders of a publicly owned corporation to exchange their shares for
cash or securities at a price above the quoted market price.""
Prior to 1989, United States style takeovers were not common in
France. With the battles for control of such large companies as T6lm&

mation" as defined under existing legislations. "[lit means that only people who know
absolutely nothing will be able to trade." COB Draws Up Tougher Insider Trading
Rules, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., May 21, 1990, at 2-3.
89. Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on
Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
90. Id. arts. 1-2.
91. Id. art. 1.
92. Id. art. 2.
93. LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 1052 (2d ed.
1988).
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canique, Btn~dictine, Moet-Hennessy Louis Vuitton (LVMH),9 4 Le
Printemps and Perrier,9 5 however, hostile takeovers have become almost
routine, largely due to the regularization of takeover rules in France
since the adoption of the 1989 law96 and regulations promulgated by the
COB and CBV. These rules demand significant disclosure by bidders
and make it very difficult to remove incumbent management. A factor
conditioning business decisions was that France's acquisitions abroad in
the past several years exceeded greatly French assets sold to foreigners
during the same period.
With no single law governing the subject matter, such as the Williams
Act in the United States, a number of official or quasi-governmental
groups undertake the French regulation of takeovers. Thus, the CBV is
responsible for the analysis and approval of the price of a cash tender
offer (offres publiques d'achat) and the terms and conditions of a share
exchange offer (offres publiques d'9change). The COB examines and
approves the prospectuses and other public statements disseminated to
shareholders during a tender offer. The Ministry of Economy and Finance coordinates the creation of regulations governing takeovers and has
control over agencies governing foreign investments (in the directorate
called Direction du Trbsor) and antitrust (in the department called Di-

rection Ggn~rale de la Concurrence).97

Representatives of these three organizations sit on the Supervisory

Board of Takeovers (Comit de Surveillance des offres publiques
d'achat), which coordinates, rather than supervises, the three abovementioned agencies.9 8 The COB and the CBV have made major deci-

sions, but rarely has the Supervisory Board played a significant role in
the government's approval of a major takeover.
The 1989 law and subsequently adopted implementing measures outline in detail how a tender offer should be conducted, what defensive
measures can be taken, and what disclosure should be made.

94. See WOLFF, supra note 12.
95. The legal battle between the Swiss food giant Nestle and the Italian Agnelli
family over the control of Perrier, the largest mineral water maker in France, lasted
about four months and was intensively reported by the international press.
96. Loi No. 89-531 (Aug. 2, 1989) (relating to the Security and Transparency of the
Financial Markets).
97. Id. See also Arrate (Sept. 28, 1989), at File V of the General Regulation of the
CBV and subsequent changes made thereof; COB R~glement 89-03.
98. See Alexander Marquardt, Tender Offers in France:The New Rules, INT'L FIN.
L. REV., Jan. 1990, at 35-37.
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Conduct of a Tender Offer

A tender offer must remain open for at least twenty days from the

date of the avis d'ouverture. Shareholders may withdraw their tenders
at any time during the offer. Competing bids must be submitted ten calendar days prior to the closing date of the original offer. If a competitor
bids, the CBV will then extend the duration of the original offer so that
both offers will close on the same date. Bidders must set competing cash
offers at a price of at least 102 percent of the prior offer, but that increase is not required if the original bidder did not offer to buy all the
target's outstanding shares and the competing bidder does so. 9
A bidder offering to buy all shares for cash may purchase the target's
shares on the open market during the duration of the offer, the offer
price being automatically increased to the greater of either 102 percent of
the offer price or the price paid on the market. If the offer is not all cash
for all shares, however, or includes some securities as consideration, the
bidder may not purchase any shares during the offering period. Once the
bid closes, and prior to the CBV's official announcement of the result,
the offeror may not sell any of the target's securities and may only
purchase additional securities on the open market at the offering price.'0
A distincive feature of French takeover law under Law No. 89-531 is
the concept of mandatory tender offers. The CBV amended Law No. 89531 in March 1992 so that shareholders who own more than one-third
of a company's common stock must launch bids for the other two-thirds,
bringing the holding to one hundred percent. 10 Because regulation,
rather than law, fixes this new threshold, future changes are possible if
the negative consequences exceed expected benefits.'0 2
This regulatory scheme contrasts sharply with the United States regulations under the Williams Act, for these regulations do not empower the
regulator to rule on purely substantive terms, such as the price and the
minimum number of shares to be bought. Instead, the William Act seeks
to use "traffic rules" to guarantee equal treatment for all stockholders
and to prevent stockholders from being rushed or unfairly pressured to
sell securities.10 3 For example, under the Securities Exchange Act of

99. Id. at 38.
100. Id.
101. Id. Under the original provisions of Loi No. 89-531, ownership of 33.3% of the
voting rights of the target corporation would trigger automatically only the bidder's obligation to offer for another one-third.
102. CBV Changes Standardsfor Making Takeover Bids, INT'L SEC. REG. REP.,
Mar. 24, 1992, at 2, 3.

103. See

ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw

551 (1986).
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1934,104 if the bidder offers to buy only a portion of the outstanding
shares of the target, and holders tender more than the number the bidder
has offered to buy, the bidder must buy in the same proportion from
each shareholder. This is called the "pro-rata rule."10 5
The CRV may approve a number of exemptions to the mandatory
tender offer provision if the exceeding of the 33 percent stock ownership
level resulted from a decrease in the number of outstanding shares, the
target is already under the control of a third party, or the bidder owns
less than 37 percent of the outstanding shares and promises to reduce his
or her ownership level to 33 percent within 18 months.
C. Defensive Measures
Once a bidder has make a tender offer, the incumbent management
can take only a limited number of defensive actions under French law. A
COB regulation, for instance, provides that management must notify the
COB of all actions beyond the ordinary course of business. The incumbent management must exercise particular prudence in redeploying assets or taking other extraordinary corporate actions, because the COB

generally prohibits measures taken primarily to defeat the offer. For instance, the board of the target company is prohibited from voting any
shares held by a subsidiary company during the offering period. 0 6 These
rules have also made it difficult for the incumbents to seek effective help
from a "white knight," a competing bidder who enters the game solely to
rescue the target's management. This is illustrated in Framatone's failed
attempt to rescue T6lm6canique, in Schneider's 1988 hostile takeover
and in a white knight's failure to resue Perrier from acquistion by
Nestle in the Spring of 1992.107

104.
105.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(6) (1988).

106. COB R~glement 89-03.
107. For the case of Tlmkcanique, see supra Berger, note 42, at 521 n.241. The
takeover war over Perrier was triggered by Nestle and its ally Banque Indosuez's attempt to control Perrier. The majority holder of Perrier, Exor (controlling 49.3% of
Perrier's voting shares), feared that Nestle would break up the company and sought help
from the Italian family Agnelli, owner of the carmaker Fiat. The latter then offered a
competing bid, through its investment subsidiary IFINT, for Perrier's shares at exactly
the same price. The Nestle camp countered by asking its ally the French food company,
BSN, to bid for the control of Exor. In response, the Agnelli camp extended a competing
but friendly bid for Exor. Eventually, what tipped the balance in favor of Nestle was the
CBV's decision that Exor, whose "acting-in-concert" with its allies Saint-Louis and
Soci&6 G~n6ale made its holding of Perrier exceed the one-third threshold, was required
by law to extend an unconditional bid for all shares of Perrier. The Agnelli camp's
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A rule more favorable to the target company's management holds that
a target company can increase its share capital throughout the duration
of an offer and can issue new stock during an offer, provided that the
increase had been approved at a shareholders' meeting prior to the offer
08
(autorisationpr~alable de l'assemblge gn rale).1
Under the 1989 law, shareholders controlling the majority of the voting or equity stock upon completion of a tender offer may call a shareholders' meeting if the target board does not do so, thus allowing the
successful offeror to elect a new board quickly.
D. Disclosure Requirement Triggered by Significant Ownership
Apart from the disclosure requirements for public offers and listings of
securities discussed earlier, any person who owns or acquires listed securities is also required under French law to disclose when his or her
holdings reach a certain level, whether through a tender offer or otherwise. In contrast to the singular five percent disclosure threshold man-

dated under the Williams Act in the United States,1" 9 French law sets up
six ownership thresholds, the crossing of each of which triggers a different disclosure requirement. These triggering levels are five percent, ten
percent, twenty percent, thirty-three and one-third percent, fifty percent,
and sixty-six and two-thirds percent. A securities owner must make a
disclosure to the company in all cases within fifteen days and to the CBV
within five market days if the shares are traded on the Official Market.
It is worth noting that regulators must take into account voting rights, as
well as ownership, when determining the statutory thresholds. Moreover, any group of purchasers "acting in concert" must also make a disclosure if their holdings added together meet one of the thresholds. 1 0
Failure to disclose in violation of the law deprives the shareholder of his
or her rights to vote on the shares in excess of the thresholds for two
years, or up to five years if a commercial court finds that circumstances
11
warrant such a penalty. '

attempt to have the French court overturn the CBV's decision was unsuccessful and the
Agnelli group had to give up the battle for Perrier in April 1992.
108.

Loi No. 89-531, art. 14.

109.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).

110.

Loi No. 89-531, arts. 17-18.

111.

Loi No. 89-531, art. 20.
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E. Disclosure Required of a Bidder in Tender Offers
Before commencing an offer, the offeror must file an application with
the CBV through the banking institution guaranting the financing arrangements for the offer." 2 This application must disclose the bidder's
intention in making the bid, any plans the bidder may have if the offer is
unsuccessful, the minimum number of securities which the offeror is
willing to accept, and the form and means of payment."' Within
twenty-four hours of such a filing, the offeror must also file a draft prospectus (note d'information) with the COB, disclosing information such
as the purpose for the offer, the future plans of the offeror, the financing
for the offer, the number of shares being offered, and the timetable for
the offer. The COB must either approve or disapprove the draft prospectus within five trading days and, upon approval, must forward this document to the target company and make it available to the target's shareholders either through publication in appropriate newspapers or
4
otherwise."1
Upon CBV's notification, the SBF automatically suspends trading in
the securities of the target company and the COB then has five days to
approve the application for the bid based on considerations such as
whether the price (cash or stock swap) is reasonable and whether the
takeover is in the public interest." 5 If approval is granted, the CBV
publishes a notice of approval and trading resumes within two market
6
days.1
F. Proposed Takeover Directive of the European Economic
Community
In September 1990 the Commission of the European Communities
adopted an amended proposal for a directive on takeover bids known as
the Proposed Takeover Directive."' This proposal aims to establish a
uniform code for takeovers in the EEC, especially with respect to minimum disclosure requirements and to permissible defensive measures.""
112. COB R~glement 88-01, September 28 Regulation, art. 5.
113. Id.
114. COB R~glement 89-03, art. 8.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Amended (Commission) Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, 1990 O.J. (C 240) 7.
118. Article 4 would establish that shareholders who are in the same position would
be treated equally and that any bidder who could end up holding one-third of the shares
carrying voting rights would have to make a full bid for the company. With respect to
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To date, passage of the directive has been delayed by various
controversies.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As the acquisitions of Perrier and Le Printemps illustrate, the division
of responsibility among the decisional securities agencies in France is far
from clear. To function most effectively, markets managers need clear
allocations of authority and control as well as accountability to the free
market. Such clear divisions of authority and competency are lacking in
the realm of French securities regulation. 1 "
If these regulatory institutions and practices are to realize accurate
and honest decisionmaking in the accumulation of wealth via the securities market, it must be recognized that funcational realities and not formal competencies will maximize such efficiencies. More critical than the
unity of the market is the need to focus upon the securities institutions

"disclosure" requirements, articles 7 and 10 of the proposal oblige the offeror to make
public its intention to make a bid as soon as it has resolved to do so and to prepare a
prospectus containing detailed information on the bid (e.g., future plans as to the target
company, particularly those concerning the continuation of the business and as to the use
of corporate assets and the composition of the board). The proposal also includes restrictions on the use of defense mechanisms by requiring that the management of the target
company be authorized by a general meeting of the shareholders before taking any defensive measure against the takeover bid. Article 22 of the amended proposal would require
member states to adopt implementing provisions by January 1, 1992, to become effective
no later than January 1, 1993. Id. arts. 4, 7, 8, 10, 22.
119. Indeed, the French newspaper Le Monde has pointed out:

But who does what? One day, the parties plead their cases before the Council
on Competition. The next day, the CBV decides that a tender offer is acceptable.
Then later on, the COB gives its green light for the transaction while the Ministry
of Finance, through the Directorate of the Treasury, approves the bid ....
In France, unlike in foreign systems, there exists no hierarchy that defines the
powers of the agencies (COB and CBV) responsible for regulating the financial
markets. The structure resembles an unstable molecule characterized by repellant
elements unwilling to subordinate their proper interest and bond together. Alone
the COB pursues its mission of protecting investors while, for its part, the CBV
works at maintaining order within the markets. From time to time, their jurisdic-

tions (champs de competgnce) overlap.
When the opinions of the two agencies as to a tender offer run counter to one
another, a most awkward conflict arises. In the confusion, the parties to the case
contest the interpretations before the courts. Ultimately the power of the judiciary
over the subject matter grows at the expense of the regulatory agencies' authority.
Isn't a multitude of regulatory bodies without hierarchy disastrous for the harmony of the marketplace?
LE MONDE, Feb. 25, 1992 (translation by authors).
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(COB, CBV, SBF, departments of State) and their decisional practices
in terms of how successful these bodies are in providing for efficient delivery of services that maximize the wealth-amassing process. Their competencies need to be determined according to how candidly these agenices
translate the amorphous investor and public confidence in the widest
possible traditional and nontraditional means of capital formation into
broad and concrete investor markets enabling businesses to grow and to
make more money to be made available for investment. These institutions need to monitor each other and thereby create a system of checks
and balances. The relevant questions remain how investors will decide
whether and what equity securities to buy. The manager-regulators can
help to promote market growth by accomodating and efficiently fostering
the common interest in securities and other markets, so vital to the process of wealth generation in industrial and mercantile capitalist societies
worldwide.
Another problem with the French regulatory regime derives from the
French tradition of statism. One example of this statist tendency occurs
when French agencies demand more information from companies than
the regulations justify. The private sector also complains that these agencies often fail to consider the need for confidentiality in the corporate
context.120
The conduct of res publica (public affairs beyond the presentation of
minimum public order). 2 ' needs to transcend the single-minded focus of
bureaucrats upon merely the goals of rational management. Such a focus
leads only to the leviathan of a jurisprudence of bureaucracy. 1 22 The
government should implement alternate forms of state regulation functions that go beyond mere rationality and institutional self-aggrandizement. State agencies should refrain from self-maintenance functions so as
to avoid the problem of placing agency interests before the interests of
the community. The principle that regulatory agencies not also regulate
themselves better promotes the furtherance of common interest and not
just agency interest. Promoting the principles of the common interest
should also govern the allocation of authority; the people's expectations
about decisionmakers and the decision process should inform both verti120. See INT'L SEC. REG. REP. (March 25, 1991).
121. For a general expiation of this guiding principle of law, see Myres S. McDougal & Siegfried Wiessner, Law and Peace in A Changing World, 22 CUMB. L. REV.
681, 683 (1992); MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORINTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 121-23 (1961).
122. For this school of jurisprudence, including the influence of Professor Hans Kelsen, see W. IICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW, ch. 9 (1987).
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cal authority within France and the EEC and horizontal authority between France and other states. Official decisions continiously shape and
recast the aggregate common interests of the investor participants in the
securities market in France, the EEC, and other states. All feel these
effects. Therefore, securities regulations must protect the common interest, and not just market participants.' 23 The process of protecting this
larger common interest in free markets and the ownership of securities
should encompass three levels of decisionmaking: first, decisions minimizing unauthorized coercion that establish public order; second, decisions that constitute and maintain structures of authority and effective
control; and third, decisions responding to intense individual demands for
the constructing and sharing of values, specifically the preserving of

equal opportunity for investment and the amassing of wealth, and values
that establish civic order."2
Viewed narrowly as a comprehensive commercial practice, however,
France's efforts to increase the candor of disclosure and the efficiency of
its stock markets have achieved success. This evolutionary process offers
many lessons for the emerging securities markets throughout the world.
A second recommendation is for continuing cross-inquiry into French
legal culture to aid Anglo-Americans in viewing their shared free market
goals from a different perspective and in continuing to reinvent their
economic cultures.' 25 France's contribution to efficient market governance and to democratic practices deserves more research and comment in
the federal system of the United States. Because the United States has no
uniform corporate law, federal securities regulation fulfills the goals of
free market candor and efficiency for multiple state business organizaztion laws. European integration may benefit from comprehensive consideration of the unity-in-diversity dilemma that characterizes the demands

123.

For clarification of the principle of common interest, 5ee MYRES S. McDOUGAL
408-15 (1980).
124. For this integrative view of decisions, see Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteriafor a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 385-87 (1971).
125. As Professor Philip Curtin explains:
Trade and exchange across cultural lines have played a crucial role in human
ErT AL.,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

history, being perhaps the most important external stimuli to change, leaving aside
the unmeasurable and less-benign influence of military conquest. External stimulation, in turn, has been the most important single source of change and development in art, science, and technology. Perhaps this goes without saying, since no
human group could invent by itself more than a small part of its cultural and
technical heritage.
PHILIP D. CURTIN, CROSS-CULTURAL TRADE IN WORLD HISTORY 1 (1984) (emphasis
added).
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within the European Community for decentralized decisionmaking. The
principle of "subsidiarity" recently adopted to prevent member states
from rejecting the Maastrich Treaty.2 may be seriously at odds with the
notion of creating a true "European Company," a Societas Europaea to
parallel to the "federal" nature corporations of the United States. 2 7 A
second look across the Atlantic may be as desirable for the new Europe,
as the reverse remains true for the United States with its leitmotiv of E

pluribus unum."I
International trade and communication in the Atlantic world stand to
benefit from cross-cultural understanding. The ultimate goal of such
open access is greater abundance and prosperity for all human beings
while at the same time balancing important environmental constraints.
The greater perspective of international trade and cross-understanding
needs to foster a domestic to global focus by providing a systematic
framework of inquiry. "The basic challenge," Professors McDougal,
Lasswell and Chen explain, "is to make continual reference of the part
to the whole in a contextual consideration of every particular question in

126.

Decisions must be made at the lowest effective level close to the citizens who

will be affected.

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,

Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992),

art G (5) inserting art. 3(b) into the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty):
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of this Treaty.
Cf

MARC WILKE, SUBSIDIARITY:

PEAN COMMUNITY

(1990);

CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE

APPROACHES TO POWER-SHARING IN THE EURO-

ANDREW ADONIS,

SUBSIDIARITY AND THE COMMUNITY'S

(1991). The subsidiarity principle was developed by the

Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) of Princeton University. Government should, Maritain said, "leave to the multifarious organs of the social body the
autonomous initiative and management of all the activities which by nature pertain to
them." JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 23 (1957).
127. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European [Stock
Corporation], 1988-89 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 268 FINAL) SYN (1989); Proposal
for a Council Directive Complementing the Statute for a European Company with Regard to the Involvement of Employees in the European Company, 1988-89 EUR. PARL.
Doc. (COM No. 268 FINAL) SYN-219 (1989).
128. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European
Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1991).
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the light of overriding goals and characteristics of the larger
community."' x O
Specific problems of securities regulation should be considered in the
light of the aggregate situations in which securities decisions develop to
increasingly deepen and strengthen an emerging global securities market.
This highly specialized arena with its institutionalized decision structures to both promote and function in the world of changing transnational market economies must continuously balance the interests of national and international markets and those of stock owners and the
public interest. Private and public international law, to this world process of authoritative decisionmaking, are indispensible and complementary components which in pluralistic and decentralized fashion respond
to claims of the free markets across multistate lines. The global process
of change we are experiencing includes more democratically responsive
governments, open forms of economic policy, national boundaries blurred
by communications and global commerce, technological advances that alter peoples expectation of life, and communications that unite people in
aspiration, awareness, and solidarity against injustices-all over the
globe.1 30 Yet, there is a caveat: "Commerce, communications and environmental matters transcend administrative borders," remarked United
Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on the rapidly changing nation-state contexts, "but inside those borders is where individuals
carry out the first order of their economic, political and social lives."''
Global trade as well as cross-cultural understanding stand to benefit as
systematic injury makes the institutional arrangements reveal the operations of individuals taking control of their destinies as they demand more
wealth, property, and financial influence over their lives."3 2

129.

McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 123, at 415.

130. See Report of the Secretary-Generalon An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111, at 3, 5
(1992).
131.
Id. at 5.
132. This Article focuses on the specific sector of society producing and distributing
the value of wealth. For an overview of the continuing demands among peoples for all
the things they want as human beings, including wealth, power, enlightenment, skill,
well-being, affection, respect, and rectitude, see generally McDOUGAL ET AL, supra note
123, at 367-448.

